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Svea Luise Herrmann (Hannover)
Deregulation via Regulation: On the
Moralisation and Naturalisation of
Embryonic Stem Cell Research in the British
Parliamentary Debates of 2000/20011
Ende 2000/Anfang 2001 legalisierte das britische Parlament das sog. „therapeutische“ Klonen
und die embryonale Stammzellforschung durch eine Änderung des Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Act von 1991. Die Autorin beschreibt diese Änderung als Deregulierung durch Regulierung und
untersucht, wie dieses Paradoxon in den Debatten im britischen Parlament über die Moralisierung
und Naturalisierung des Issues „gelöst“ wurde. Während einerseits die Vernutzung von Embryonen
in der Forschung als „natürlich“ und gleichzeitig als eine Frage der persönlichen moralischen Hal-
tung und Entscheidung konzeptionalisiert wurde, wurde andererseits eine generelle rechtliche Ein-
schränkung der Forschung als „moralische Nötigung“ dargestellt. Frauen/Paare wurden in den De-
batten als diejenigen konstruiert, die, als Resultat ihrer natürlich-biologischen Beziehung zum Em-
bryo, moralisch sowohl für die Begrenzung als auch die Ermöglichung der Forschung verantwortlich
sind. Das Parlament hingegen hatte letztendlich nur die Funktion, Entscheidungsmöglichkeiten ein-
zuräumen und generelle Begrenzungen der Forschung zu vermeiden.
At the end of 2000 and beginning of 2001,
the British parliament legalised so-called “thera-
peutic” cloning and embryonic stem cell re-
search by amending the 1990 Human Fertilisa-
tion and Embryology Act (HFE Act). Up until
then, Britain already had some of the most com-
prehensive and permissive legislation on em-
bryo research compared to other European coun-
tries such as Germany or France.2  The relaxa-
tion of an already broad law is interesting be-
cause, first, there was unease among the British
public about practices such as “therapeutic”
cloning and embryonic stem cell research be-
cause of fears that they would lead down the
“slippery slope” towards reproductive cloning
as well as because of discomfort about embryo
research in general.3  Second, there was, and still
is, great uncertainty about the results of the re-
search. The benefits claimed for the research are
by no means assured, a fact, which even sup-
porters of amending the law acknowledged.
Nonetheless, parliament approved changes in
the law, thereby permitting embryo research for
an extremely broad range of purposes.
Although the legal changes facilitated more
embryo research, control and limitation of re-
search were in fact the key issues in the parlia-
mentary debates. This leads to a paradox that I
call deregulation via regulation. In this paper, I
analyse the British parliamentary debates in
terms of how this paradox has been discursively
“resolved” by moralising, naturalising and in-
dividualising the issue. Embryonic stem cell
research and “therapeutic” cloning were at the
same time conceptualised as natural processes
and as subject to personal, moral beliefs. Thus,
rather than advocating legal limits, many Mem-
bers of Parliament (MPs) argued in favour of
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the moral action of the individual, on the basis
of the discursive naturalisation of moral behav-
iour. Within this discourse, women had an es-
sential function: it is women who were concep-
tualised as responsible for limiting as well as
facilitating embryonic stem cell research and
“therapeutic” cloning because of their biologi-
cal connection to the embryo and their (natural)
moral ability to decide about “life”. Women, in
effect, were constructed as the melting pot in
which deregulation, regulation, moralisation and
naturalisation converged.
To understand the function of references to
women/their body parts within the British par-
liamentary debates, I have summarized the main
argumentative strands in terms of what Schön
and Rein have called “frames of argumentation”.
“Framing”, as Schön/Rein (1993, 147) define
it, refers to the process “by which people con-
struct interpretations of problematic situations,
making them coherent from various perspectives
and providing users with evaluative frameworks
within which to judge and how to act”. Thus,
frames “determine what counts as evidence and
how evidence is interpreted” (Schön/Rein 1993,
145) with regard to decision-making. My paper
offers an inductive analysis of how speakers in
the debates framed the problem. Special empha-
sis is put on how they referred to women/wom-
en’s participation in embryo research in order
to show what function these references to
women had within the framing process. I ana-
lyse four parliamentary debates in the House of
Commons (lower house) and one in the House
of Lords (upper house), which took place be-
tween 17th November 2000 and 22nd January
2001. First, however, I give a brief summary of
the events preceding the debates.
Historical Background
The British 1990 HFE Act4  regulates, among
other things, infertility treatment, the status of
children born after in vitro fertilisation (IVF),
and the cryopreservation of embryos and em-
bryo research. It allows research on in-vitro
embryos for up to 14 days after fertilisation, if
the goals of research cannot be met in other ways
and if such research serves one of five research
purposes: (1) to advance IVF; (2) to understand
the causes of miscarriage; (3) to improve con-
traception; (4) to develop methods of detecting
genetic or chromosomal deviations in embryos
before implantation; and (5) to understand con-
genital diseases (cf. Morgan/Lee 1990). It man-
dates the establishment of a licensing authority
– the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Au-
thority (HFEA) – which began operating in
August 1991. The Act remained relatively un-
controversial until 1996, when thousands of fro-
zen embryos were destroyed because they could
not legally be kept for more than five years.5  In
1997, the birth in Edinburgh of the first mam-
mal cloned from an adult cell, Dolly the sheep,6
was announced, prompting fears that the prac-
tice could be applied to humans. These events
brought questions about embryo research, the
status of the embryo and the meaning of assisted
conception back into public debate and onto the
political agenda. In response to concerns about
human cloning, the HFEA and the Human Ge-
netics Advisory Commission (HGAC)7  estab-
lished the Cloning Working Group (CWG) in
January 1998 to hold a public consultation and
to advise the government on cloning issues. Its
report (HFEA/HGAC 1998), published in De-
cember 1998, recommended that the existing
legislation be amended to provide for two more
research purposes: research into therapies for
tissue and organ illnesses, and research into
mitochondrical diseases, thereby, implicitly al-
lowing “therapeutic” cloning and embryonic
stem cell research.8  The report also stated that
the 1990 HFE Act did not prohibit cloning but
queried whether the HFEA had any authority
over cloned embryos, because they were not the
result of fertilisation (the definition of an em-
bryo in the HFE Act) and thus not necessarily
subject to HFEA licences.9
Despite this report, the British government
took no immediate steps towards legalising
“therapeutic” cloning and embryonic stem cell
research. One reason for its hesitation might
have been the opposition within the British pub-
lic at that time to genetically modified crops.
The government may have feared that such
scepticism could spill over into human genet-
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ics, meaning that public support for the new
regulations was an open question (Sexton
2000).
The cloning issue was handed over to the
Chief Medical Officer, Liam Donaldson, a
move, which many interpreted as a delaying tac-
tic. He appointed an Expert Advisory Group on
Therapeutic Cloning, whose report (Department
of Health 2000a) was published in August 2000
when parliament was on its summer recess. The
report supported the recommendations10  already
made by the HFEA/HGAC group, and the
Donaldson recommendations were then fully
accepted by the government (Department of
Health 2000b). Both Houses of Parliament de-
bated the issue between November 2000 and
January 2001.11  Interestingly, just a few days
before the vote in the House of Commons (HC),
the government published its draft regulations
that differed from Donaldson’s recommenda-
tions. On 19th December 2000, the HC voted on
three (not two) new research purposes which
were much broader than those suggested by
Donaldson. The draft regulations would permit
embryo research (under licence from the HFEA)
if it served: (1) increasing knowledge about the
development of embryos; (2) increasing knowl-
edge about serious diseases; or (3) enabling any
such knowledge to be applied in developing
treatments for serious diseases. In a free vote,
the HC divided with 366 ayes and 174 noes.
Although the amended regulations were pre-
sented by the Labour government, there was no
clear-cut division in the vote along party politi-
cal lines. Supporters and opponents were from
all sides. Similarly, there was no observable di-
vision along gender lines. Women’s participa-
tion in the HC debates, however, was remark-
ably high (41.2% of the main speakers were
women12 ) compared to the number of women
MPs (18.2%) (cf. HC Factsheets 2002). In the
House of Lords (HL) debate on 22nd January
2001, 34.1% of the speakers were women. The
Upper House approved the changes of the law
with 212 ayes and 92 noes. It decided, however,
to set up a Select Committee13  to investigate
the implications of the changes. Its report was
published in February 2002 (Select Committee
2002).
Nothing New to Discuss: The Embryo-
Question …
The British parliamentary debates took place
within a legal context that already allowed em-
bryo research to further infertility treatment and
procreation. Within this setting, it was critical
to portray the new regulations as minimal
changes to the existing law that did not entail
any new ethical or social implications. This ar-
gument formally justified the government’s de-
cision to amend existing legislation rather than
to introduce primary legislation. By doing so,
MPs could not amend the draft regulations but
only approve or reject them. This was strongly
criticised by opponents of the new regulations
as misjudging the importance of the changes in
the law. Supporters, however, put much effort
into playing down the novel character of the new
purposes, stating that “therapeutic” cloning was
not an entirely new practice and was not pro-
hibited by law.
The “nothing new argument” was facilitated
by discursively separating reproductive from
“therapeutic” cloning, a separation that the
CWG and Donaldson reports had already em-
phasised. Drawing a supposedly clear line be-
tween the “acceptable” (therapeutic) and the
“unacceptable” (reproductive) application of
science was a prerequisite for the legitimation
of “therapeutic” cloning.14
Although “therapeutic” and reproductive
cloning differ from each other only in their fi-
nal application and not in the practices
themselves, the delegitimation of reproductive
cloning actually supported the legitimation of
“therapeutic” cloning.15  Thus, banning “re-
productive cloning” was one of the major de-
mands of supporters of the new embryo re-
search regulation. Those opposed to the new
regulations could not counter the separation,
opposition and, finally, legitimation via
delegitimation, although they did emphasise
the similarity of both practices and that “thera-
peutic” cloning would open the gates to repro-
ductive cloning. Supporters of extending the
HFE Act successfully managed to frame
“therapeutic” cloning in terms of practices al-
ready legal in Britain.
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The “status of the embryo” played a central
role in the debates. A legal context of already
allowing embryo research for some purposes
helped supporters to claim that embryonic stem
cell research and “therapeutic” cloning did not
have any new ethical or social implications. The
focus on the embryo question led to the “repro-
duction” of the 1980s debates, which was the
safety net of pro-research MPs (Parry 2003).
Supporters claimed that all ethical questions
about embryo research had, in principle, been
discussed and solved, and that the practices of
cloning and embryonic stem cell research – if
they had existed in 1990 – would have been
regulated by the HFE Act.16
The comparison between the legally permit-
ted research into procreation and infertility and
the proposed research into curing serious dis-
eases was a heavily moral-laden one that lent
weight to allowing the new research purposes.
Since both kinds of research involve embryos,
the new purposes were presented as a “logical
extension” of the old ones, as the following
quote suggests:
For my part, these new regulations are in keeping with
the HFE Act. In fact not only are they a logical exten-
sion of it; ... (i)f it was ethically and morally accept-
able to pass the 1990 Act, then to see that research
potentially benefit a wider section of society is surely
to be welcomed (Baroness Northover, HL 22/01/2001,
Col. 35)
On what grounds, supporters argued, could
research into contraception and infertility treat-
ment be allowed but not the morally more rea-
sonable research into serious diseases, which
would help “wider sections of society”?
Opponents of the new regulations, however,
insisted that the embryo had to be protected from
fertilisation onwards, voicing an opposition to
embryo research in general as a violation of the
integrity of human life. Supporters countered
that this argument had been superseded by ex-
isting law – and that the government had cate-
gorically stated that the issues discussed in the
1980ies were not open for renegotiation. Sup-
porters were able to frame opposition to the new
regulations as being against the existing law and
to present the new regulations themselves as
within the law. Thus one of the main arguments
presented by opponents – the inviolability of the
embryo – proved to be the weakest.
… and the “Greater Good”
Nevertheless, some unease towards the use
of embryos in research persisted. The status of
the embryo, hence, was set against another cen-
tral element of the debate: the “greater good for
society”. “Benefits to society” or “the common”
or “greater good” were framed as the ultimate
goal of cloning and embryonic stem cell re-
search, that is, ending suffering and enabling
general societal progress by means of scientific
progress. It was this “greater good” that ulti-
mately was able to outweigh any respect for the
embryo.
Most members of the public, whether they are reli-
gious or would describe themselves as humanist or
secular, recognise the special and sacred nature of
human life. They believe that there must be respect
for that entity. The only circumstances in which re-
search on this cluster of cells (the embryo; S.H.) should
be permissible is when a genuine greater good for
society will be served (Baroness Kennedy of The
Shaws, HL 22/01/2001, Col. 47).
This “greater good” was portrayed as reliev-
ing the suffering of the “seriously ill”, who were
portrayed as being a “cost to society”. To re-
lieve suffering means, as Labour MP Anne Begg
suggested, to “cut waste”, since “waste in per-
sonal terms and in life is a cost to society” (HC
15/11/2000, Col. 911). (The argument about the
“seriously ill” is discussed below.)
Scientific progress, in contrast, was described
as generally improving society: as a practice and
as a means to provide knowledge “which al-
lows us to lead our lives and create society in a
better way” (Peter Brand, HC 17/11/2000, Col.
1196). This goal – the improvement of society
– seemed unassailable. Supporters claimed the
inevitability as well as the necessity of scien-
tific progress for the improvement of British
society, economy and international competitive-
ness. They also referred to a possible “brain
drain” and thus the potential loss of Britain’s
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standing at the forefront of international bio-
technology that might follow a rejection of the
proposed legal amendment.17  If the issue was
deferred or defeated, Baroness Warwick of
Undercliffe said that
(i)t would mean that our scientists in universities and
in industry would loose any hope of remaining at the
cutting edge of the technology which involves a branch
of science in which the UK is currently pre-eminent
(HL 22/01/2001, Col. 53).
Participation in scientific experimentation
appeared inevitable while societal improvement
was understood as an uncontested, albeit not-
defined, objective. Non-participation implied
the risk that society would decay or stagnate.
Thus the status of the embryo and the greater
good for society formed the general frame of
the debates. The issue of embryonic stem cell
research and “therapeutic” cloning was framed
as a conflict between the two and the solution
lay in their balancing.
The “Abnormality” of Suffering …
The framing of the proposed regulations as
nothing new and as aiding the search for “the
greater good” was strengthened by pro-research
MPs who emphasised the importance of embry-
onic stem cell research for society and for the
individual sufferer of “serious diseases”. They
achieved this by constructing a group of suffer-
ers who would benefit from stem cell research.18
This construction of a need within society had a
strong moralising effect. Many speakers in the
debate repeatedly asserted that parliament had
a strong moral obligation to facilitate the find-
ing of cures for these sufferers. Such cures, sup-
porters stated, could be made available through
embryonic stem cell research, while the oppo-
sition pointed to adult stem cell research. As
Sarah Parry (2003) puts it, “science and tech-
nology are positioned as a bridge at the point
when ‘life’s natural progression’ is broken off
by … illness”.
The claim that new scientific research was
needed was backed up by interpreting the con-
dition of being sick or disabled as “abnormal”
and science and technology as a device to re-
establish normality.
Hell in that case is an end to normal life as we know it
(Gareth Thomas, HC 17/11/2000, Col. 1199).
… Parkinson’s – certainly a disease, and certainly
abnormal (Dr. Peter Brand, HC 17/11/2000, Col.
1196).
At the same time, the construction of a group
of people who might benefit from the new re-
search facilitated the construction of the moral
duty of MPs – as the representatives of the peo-
ple – to create the conditions to allow for new
research.
Just imagine what would happen if we could find a
cure for diabetes and restore someone to normality
… If we use the argument that we should not go ahead
and begin the research, we would not be doing justice
to the people whom we represent in Parliament
(Michael Fabricant, HC 15/12/2000, Col. 920).
We have a duty to society and to the sufferers of de-
generative diseases (Joan Ruddock, HC 17/11/2000,
Col. 1211).
Against the background of all the possibili-
ties claimed for embryonic stem cell research,
the construction of a group of sufferers leading
“abnormal” lives produced some kind of duty
of parliament to give them hope through scien-
tific research. If people have a “right to normal-
ity”, then parliament has the duty to facilitate
normality. Parliament was thus understood as
having “… the power to authorise the research
that could trigger life-saving and life-transform-
ing treatments and cures … “ (Yvette Cooper,
HC 15/12/2000, Col. 880) and the duty or re-
sponsibility not to limit research. In the context
of the “abnormality of suffering”, any restric-
tion was portrayed by supporters as denying
people the right to normality.
Science itself, particularly adult or embryonic
stem cell research, was rarely scrutinised or criti-
cised in the parliamentary debates, either by
opponents or supporters of extending embryo
research. While supporters stressed the neces-
sity of scientific development in general, oppo-
nents proffered the opinion that any prohibition
of “immoral” research would not hinder
progress in general. Although Germany has the
strictest regulations regarding embryo research,
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Conservative MP Anne Winterton stated, “…
its biotechnology industry has outstripped the
industry in Great Britain” (HC 17/11/2000, Col.
1205).
If there was any critique of science, it was more
about whether scientific experimentation could
be controlled or not (the slippery slope argument)
than about its appropriateness, effectiveness or
the predictability of results.19  Indeed, it was pre-
cisely the unpredictability of results that made
research even more desirable, according to sup-
porters. As Labour MP Anne Begg said:
It is precisely because scientists do not know the an-
swer that we need the research. If research does not
work, that is fine; nothing else will happen. However,
we must have the research in the first place (HC 15/
12/2000, Col. 902).
If science cannot provide certainty, it can pro-
vide hope: “… (S)tem cells may be the only
thing on the horizon that holds out any hope”
(Yvette Cooper, HC 19/12/2000, Col. 213). 20
Regardless of the fact that scientific results are
unpredictable for epistemological reasons,
something that even ardent supporters of the
proposed new regulations acknowledged, sup-
porters and opponents both agreed that stem cell
research (embryonic or adult) was the right an-
swer to the problem. Hence, alternatives to (adult
or embryonic) stem cell research to alleviate
suffering, such as social responses, were not
discussed, nor were other aspects of these seri-
ous diseases, such as causation.
The question as to whether or not to use thera-
pies derived from embryo research was framed
as an individual decision: accepting treatment
remains subject to “consent”, a question of a
“right” to choose. This, as the quote below by
Liberal Democrat MP Evan Harris suggests,
implies a duty to provide choice and not to re-
strict options:
Accepting treatment is a personal decision. It is quite
reasonable that some people already do not accept
certain treatments … The whole point about the regu-
lations is that they are permissive … They will not
force people to accept the treatment (HC 19/12/2000,
Col. 253).
Despite the government’s lack of defining
“serious diseases”, the demand to facilitate the
finding and offering of cures proved to be one
that opponents of the new research purposes
could not counter. Strong moral connotations
of “severe and unbearable” were difficult, if not
impossible, to argue against. Moreover, the
broad and non-defined “serious disease” argu-
ment allowed many different interpretations.
Many different actors could agree to the demand
for cures without necessarily sharing the same
understanding of “serious disease”. What is
more, the concept (albeit undefined) of “seri-
ous diseases” implied a dividing-line from
“trivial diseases” and thus served as a device to
limit research.
… and the “Naturalness” of Embryo
Destruction
The “abnormality of suffering” was contrasted
with the “inevitability” or “naturalness” of em-
bryo destruction, and this is where women – or
rather their uteruses – came into play. By refer-
ring to both the “wasteful process” of natural
procreation and the “useless destruction of em-
bryos leftover from IVF”, embryo research ap-
peared logical, reasonable and, in a sense, ethi-
cally more responsible. The (very rare) refer-
ences to women or their body parts had an im-
portant function within the argument to relax
the HFE Act. References to the “uterus as hos-
tile environment” in which embryos die natu-
rally served to naturalise embryonic stem cell
research (cf. also Parry 2003).
Millions of fertilised embryos are regularly lost and
discarded in the course of normal human conception
(Lord Walton of Detchant, HL 22/01/2001, Col. 104).
I know that the ball of cells growing in the uterus has
a potential to develop into a human being, but I also
know that the uterus is a hostile environment and that
many of the egg cells do not survive the vicissitudes
of the uterus and all biochemical events that go on
there. The process is not often recognised, but it’s a
natural process that has been talked about for some
years (Ian Gibson, HC 17/11/2000, Col. 119; empha-
sis added).
Even if the embryo had the potential to de-
velop into a human being, according to MP Ian
Gibson, chair of the HC Science and Technol-
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ogy Committee, this potential depends on it be-
ing placed inside the uterus. But there is as much,
if not more, likelihood that it does not survive
than that it develops. Outside the uterus – and
thus deprived of the potential to become a hu-
man being – its destruction in research seemed
more consistent and sensible.
Public health minister Yvette Cooper con-
structed the same logic with regard to embryos
left over from IVF: “As long as IVF continues,
hundreds of thousands of spare embryos will
be created. Most are destroyed” (Yvette Cooper,
HC 19/12/2000, Col. 214).
The description of the destruction of spare IVF
embryos and the death of embryos in the uterus
as inevitable or natural functioned to justify fur-
ther embryo research. Within a discourse that
focused on the embryo and claimed that the pro-
posed regulations were “nothing new”, an em-
bryo’s “inevitable” or “natural” destruction/
death was equated with its destruction in stem
cell research, which appeared to be more logi-
cal and ethically responsible.21  Within this fram-
ing, both “the abnormality of suffering” and the
“naturalness/inevitability of embryo destruc-
tion” converged: “wasted lives” and “wasted
embryos” could both be made efficient via the
use of embryos in research. In this way, embry-
onic stem cell research appeared as a “normal”/
”natural” device to re-establish normality.
References to IVF not only functioned to natu-
ralise embryonic stem cell research but also to
construct IVF patients as affirmative donors to
science:
If Parliament votes against these regulations, hon.
Members will deny couples the choice to donate their
spare embryos to stem cell research for spinal injury
or stroke (Yvette Cooper, HC 19/12/2000, Col. 214;
emphasis added).
… (M)any of the infertile couples … are being helped
by the current legislation and would like to be permit-
ted by the new regulations to donate their surplus fer-
tilised eggs to be used to help sick people (Baroness
Walmsley, HL 22/01/2001, Col. 101; emphasis added).
While the proposed new regulations were
translated into permission to donate, the need
for embryos in scientific research was trans-
formed into a “right” to donate – science’s in-
terest in embryos is transformed into the inter-
est of a potential donor. Thus, it became parlia-
ment’s duty not only to promote better health,
but also not to deny people the freedom to
choose to donate.
Nonetheless, talk about a right to donate can-
not obscure the moral implications of donation;
Ingrid Schneider (2003) has called this the
“Sozialpflichtigkeit” (social responsibility) of
the female body. A hint of this social responsi-
bility to donate appears in the HL’s Stem Cell
Research Report, which constructs women as
the selfless female caretakers of the family:
Some medical charities and patients’ support groups
argued that female members of a patient’s family
would be prepared to donate eggs for altruistic mo-
tives, and this is no doubt true in some cases (Select
Committee 2002, 5.9).
Labour MP Joan Ruddock placed the argu-
ment of a “choice to donate” within a wider
framework of a particular understanding of
“what life is”; according to her, women and their
partners who have undergone IVF treatment
have a particular sense of this: The source of
their emotional distress is childlessness rather
than “left-over” embryos that arise unavoidably
as a by-product of IVF treatment. Thus,
Ruddock insisted that it would not be necessary
to produce embryos for research and implied
that embryo destruction was inevitable. At the
same time, she conceptualised embryo donation
for research purposes as an individual desire:
There is no suggestion that women should be asked
to donate their eggs for scientific research. The eggs
and embryos that are the subject of the debate arise in
laboratories of doctors who attempt to assist those who
are infertile … (A)ssisted conception is the motiva-
tion for the production of embryos, and all those in-
volved have to give their express consent … As some-
one who experienced the pain of childlessness, I be-
lieve that I can understand the feelings of those who
seek IVF treatment. More than most, they have an
acute sense of what life is … Those are the people
who would be asked to donate their eggs and em-
bryos that would otherwise be destroyed. My guess is
that many of them will feel that, for up to 14 days,
their human cells can be used for alternative and ethi-
cal purposes that would advance the common good.
As the Minister explained, that common good is re-
search into degenerative diseases (Joan Ruddock, HC
17/11/2000, Col. 1210; emphasis added).22
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Within the rights frame, the interpretation of
embryo donation for ethical purposes as an in-
dividual’s personal desire once again character-
ised any general restriction or limiting interven-
tion as a denial of rights and personal wishes.
Moreover, Joan Ruddock linked the desire to
donate “surplus embryos” to the improvement
of the “common good”, which then appeared as
a personal moral objective.
Conservative MP Anne Winterton similarly
referred to a “natural knowledge of life” that
women have, although she opposed embryo re-
search:
As a mother and grandmother, I must confess that I
become quite emotional when I think of the begin-
ning of life for children; each on the first day after
conception no bigger than a full stop, yet miracu-
lously sustaining, controlling and directing their own
development in the production of every different type
of cell and tissue to bring them to what they are to-
day. The fact that we have scientists who think of
these, who are definitely human, simply as a source
to be exploited in obtaining cells and tissue, I find
frightening (HC 17/11/2000, Col. 1204; emphasis
added).
While disagreeing on the legitimacy of em-
bryo research in general, both Ruddock and
Winterton referred to the connection between
women/couples and embryos as a natural in-
stance of moral ability and responsibility: both
put women/couples in a position to know “what
life is” because of their physical/biological par-
ticipation in IVF or natural procreation. In
Ruddock’s words, it is IVF patients’ suffering
that teaches them “what life is” and thus ena-
bles them to decide. Although opposed to em-
bryo research, Winterton’s argument had a simi-
lar grounding: her ability to know “what life is”
was based on her function as a mother and
grandmother.
Ruddock’s statement that women/couples will
gladly donate their embryos for the “common
good” illustrates that arguments citing “desire”,
“right”, “choice” or “altruism” all imply an in-
dividual moral objective to serve a “common/
greater good”. Women/couples are portrayed as
a natural entity; based on their individual moral
judgment, they can facilitate scientific research
in order to serve this common good.
But even terms such as “choice” or “right”
were not used to refer to particular women’s
interests nor were any gender implications of
these notions raised. The danger of instru-
mentalising the female body in reprogenetic re-
search and practice, which played an important
role both in the European (cf. Abels, this vol-
ume) and in the German context (cf. Braun, this
volume) were not on the agenda in the British
debates. Despite the relatively high numbers of
women speakers, gender-related issues – pro or
contra research – were not discussed.
Control and Restriction
While general limitation by the state of em-
bryo research was portrayed as denying options
and rights, its control and limitation nonetheless
formed one of the most critical arguments of
those in favour of the new research purposes.
Although supporters emphasised that science had
to cross (ethical) borders in order to proceed,
they also stressed that it could be controlled.
I want to stress that the research will proceed in this
country only under closely regulated conditions which
are unparalleled elsewhere in the world (Baroness
Greengross, HL 22/01/2001, Col. 86).
If scientific experimentation is framed in terms
of its use and abuse, then control of such re-
search concerns the prevention of abuse, in this
instance, the prevention of reproductive clon-
ing and of over-extensive and unlimited embry-
onic stem cell research (for example, into
“trivial” diseases). Reference to “women’s par-
ticipation”23  shores up and reinforces the barri-
ers between use and abuse. Reproductive clon-
ing cannot happen because
… the embryo could grow into a foetus only if it were
implanted into the womb, a process that is illegal and
a criminal act in the UK. In other words, there is a
three-fold barrier which prevents any possibility of
the technique being used in this country for human
reproductive cloning (Baroness Sharp of Guildford,
HL 22/01/2001, Col. 111).
Because the new research purposes were
framed as minor changes to an existing law, the
157
new practices had to be framed as restricted or
restrictable. But control or restriction would be
achieved not via prohibition by the state, but by
constructing a “natural” border: via their physi-
cal participation within the research processes,
women functioned as gate-keepers of this bor-
der, this time in their capacity as egg donors:
… (S)cientists themselves will follow the successful
science. Working on embryos will not be easy. One
speaker said that there will be a rush to use embryos
because the work is easy. It is extremely difficult to
derive eggs for cell nuclear replacement … it is not a
trivial matter for a woman to donate eggs, whether
for embryos for IVF or for this sort of research. Eggs
are in extremely short supply (Evan Harris, HC 19/
12/2000, Col. 255).
A shortage of egg cells and the difficult pro-
cess of egg retrieval formed a “natural” border
to over-extensive research. Women were por-
trayed as individual, “natural” gatekeepers
against the abuse of science: their physical par-
ticipation makes over-extensive research impos-
sible.
In contrast, a general limitation of scientific
research was referred to as “fundamentalism”.
Although it was stressed that there are moral
arguments on both sides and that each position
deserved respect, within the context of a “right
to be normal”, a “right to donate” or a “right to
choose therapies”, any restriction of research
appeared as “fundamentalist”. Conservative MP
Robert Key said: “If we are not careful we be-
come fundamentalists hanging on to a few dog-
mas that we do not intend to examine and which
we will not give up” (HC 17/11/2000, Col.
1216).
In line with the individual rights argument,
any restriction of scientific endeavour appeared
as a “moral imposition”, as “denying opportu-
nities” and “rights”. As MP Peter Brand sum-
marised:
I find it really difficult when hon. Members’ personal
deeply felt opinions – which I respect – form the
framework for denying other people’s opportunities.
I know that it is right that in all we do in our personal
lives we should be guided by our beliefs, but I have
some difficulty when those beliefs are imposed on
others (HC 17/11/2000, Col. 1195).
Conclusion: Deregulation via Regulation
The British parliamentary debates led to the
relaxation of regulation governing embryo re-
search in the UK. Today, British law allows al-
most any kind of embryo research. Neverthe-
less, while the result of the debates was not to
limit embryo research but to facilitate more of
it, the emphasis on limitation and control served
as an important pro research argument. The as-
surance that research was subject to control and
limitation was decisive in the deregulation proc-
ess, leading to the apparent paradox of deregu-
lation via regulation.
One of the major devices to justify the legali-
sation of “therapeutic” cloning was the de-le-
gitimation of reproductive cloning. Via the sepa-
ration and opposition of both, and the prohibi-
tion of the “unacceptable” application, the de-
regulation of “therapeutic” cloning was made
acceptable. At the same time, the prohibition of
reproductive cloning was declared as a means
of control or restriction of the new practice –
regulating one was a device to deregulate the
other.24
This contradiction was discursively resolved
via the naturalisation/normalisation of the is-
sue. Framing the issue in terms of nature and
normality, that is, the “naturalness/inevitability
of embryo destruction” and the “abnormality of
suffering”, which were both described as
“waste”, helped to portray the use of embryos
in research as logical and morally responsible.
Because those who suffer were conceptualised
as leading abnormal lives, parliament was un-
derstood as having the moral duty to create the
conditions that could lead to the re-establish-
ment of normality and thus not to limit scien-
tific research.
Moreover, the problem of embryo research
was framed as a moral issue, that is, as a ques-
tion of different individual beliefs and deeply
felt personal opinions, all of which were under-
stood as equally moral. One of the effects of
this framing was the individualisation of deci-
sion-making: the issue was portrayed as a mat-
ter of individual moral judgement rather than
state intervention. As supporters of the new re-
search stated, it is subject to personal moral de-
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cisions and consent, a question of a right to
choose whether or not to donate eggs or em-
bryos and whether or not to use therapies de-
rived from embryo research. Within this frame,
any general restriction must appear as a “moral
imposition” or as “fundamentalist”, and, hence,
as the denial of choices and rights.
The interpretation of general restrictions as a
“moral imposition” and of limitation as subject
to individual moral decision-making formed the
framework within which deregulation via regu-
lation functioned. Regulation became the task
of personal choice and personal moral behav-
iour, while parliament was interpreted as hav-
ing the moral duty to ease the grounds on which
options could be provided. Parliament was por-
trayed as having not limiting but facilitating
power, as having the “power to authorise” but
not to hinder research. The background ethical
principles were those of informed consent, au-
tonomy, voluntary (moral) action and choice,
all of which were depicted as relying on non-
intervention by the state. Thus, it was not state-
political jurisdiction but personal decision-mak-
ing and individual moral responsibility that had
the authority to “regulate” embryonic stem cell
research and “therapeutic” cloning. But in the
parliamentary debates, decision-making was not
construed as an entirely individual matter but
was also connected discursively to what was
called “the greater good”. The goal of decision-
making, as pro-research MPs portrayed it, was
the welfare of a greater entity than the individual:
the well being of the seriously ill and the greater
good of society. As Rose (2001) has pointed out,
the new biomedicine is not totally individualis-
ing, as many critics have stated, but entails new
forms of collectivism. Potential egg donors are
connected to the seriously ill; IVF patients are
connected to researchers or potential users of
therapies derived from embryo research.
The abstention from a general limitation of
research was accompanied by a responsi-
blisation (Rose 1999) of the individual: the
conceptualisation of women/couples as gate-
keepers against abuse and, at the same time, as
facilitators of research is exemplary of this.
Women/couples were conceptualised as those
who choose whether to donate or not. Portrayed
as their “right”, “desire” or “choice”, they not
only have the option to donate but also a moral
responsibility to facilitate research or to restrict
it. This function as gate-keeper and their ability
to make a moral judgement were depicted as
deriving from their physical participation in egg
or embryo donation, IVF, motherhood or pro-
creation: their suffering because of childless-
ness, leading them to IVF; their biological func-
tion as a mother; or their capacity to procreate
enables them and, at the same time, makes them
responsible to make a moral decision. Rose has
called the process of somatisation and individu-
alisation of decision-making ethopolitics, a term
he uses to describe the establishment of “direct
relations … between our biology and our con-
duct” (Rose 2001, 1). Biological existence and
physical involvement become the – ostensibly
objective – basis for individual moral decision-
making. Within the ethopolitical paradigm, the
production of naturalness through technology,
in this case, the re-establishment of naturalness
through scientific experimentation, or more gen-
erally, the subjection of nature to choice, is not
contradictory, but essential. Nature, biology or
corporality are not understood as unchangeable
fate but as subject to individual choice and re-
sponsibility and are bound up with responsible
moral behaviour.
As to the general approval of science and sci-
entific experimentation, it was not surprising that
the scientists wanting to conduct the research
did not appear as those who make moral deci-
sions. It was parliament and those individuals
who choose to donate or not who make moral
decisions; science and scientists were absolved
of questions of responsibility, values and mor-
als and portrayed as simply “objective”. Thus,
the moralisation and individualisation of the is-
sue served to protect science’s supposed objec-
tivity, which underpinned the process of deregu-
lation via regulation.
Within the British parliamentary debates, gen-
eral boundaries of embryonic stem cell research,
were on the one hand, disqualified as “moral
imposition”, while, on the other, securing con-
trol and limitation was formally and morally
essential to back up and disguise the deregula-
tion. References to women/couples had the
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important function of combining deregulation
and regulation: Within women/couples, both
merged; women/couples were conceptualised as
the individual moral instance that functions as
a natural, objective gate-keeper and as
facilitators of research because of their personal
moral judgement, which was portrayed as the
result of their physical involvement. At the same
time, the “moral imposition” of general borders
could be avoided.
REFERENCES
1 I thank the Heinrich Böll-Stiftung, Berlin, for finan-
cial support of my research and Sarah Sexton (The
CornerHouse) and Sarah Franklin for critical discus-
sions. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewer
of the ÖZP for her/his extremely valuable comments.
2 For an overview on regulation across Europe, cf.
Gratton (2003).
3 Several groups and individuals, including the Cam-
paign Against Human Genetic Engineering, some
Church leaders and anti-abortion groups, lobbied
against the extension of the HFE Act. Until just be-
fore the vote, the government could not be sure what
the outcome would be: a few days before the vote,
Public Health Minister Yvette Cooper, and her coun-
terpart in the Lords, Lord Hunt, wrote to all MPs
setting out arguments in favour of giving a go-ahead
to the research in order to prevent the new regula-
tions from being defeated.
4 On the debates preceding the implementation of the
1990 HFE Act, cf. Mulkay (1993; 1994; 1997) and
Franklin (1999a). For a comparison of the British
parliamentary debates in 1990 with those in 2000/
2001 regarding the convergence of embryos and stem
cells, cf. Parry (2003).
5 The HFE Act prescribes that frozen embryos must
not be kept for more than five years. As the first li-
cences were issued in August 1991, the first dead-
lines were in August 1996, cf. Franklin (1999b).
6 On the “cloning debate” in Britain, cf. Sexton (1999).
7 The HGAC was an independent advisory body which
counselled the government on questions of human
genetics. In 1999, it was replaced by the Human
Genetics Commission (HGC).
8 The report recommended the amendment of the HFE
Act despite the fact that about 40% of those who
replied to the public consultation voiced concern or
disapproval of human cloning (cf. 190 replies to the
HFEA/HGCA consultation, held by the Department
of Health).
9 The HFEA’s jurisdiction over cloned embryos was
subsequently challenged in court by the Pro-Life
Alliance on the grounds that a cloned embryo is not
an embryo under UK law because fertilisation is not
involved. The court ruled that the HFEA had no au-
thority over cloned embryos. The UK government
then rushed through legislation at the end of 2001
prohibiting reproductive cloning (The Guardian
2001). The court’s ruling, however, was subsequently
overturned on appeal.
10 The report makes nine recommendations altogether,
although only two refer to research purposes.
11 The debates are documented in Hansard, HC De-
bates of 17th November, 15th and 19th December
2000 (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/
cmhansard.htm) and Hansard, HL Debates of 22nd
January 2001 (http://www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/ld/ldvol621.htm).
12 The Public Health Minister who introduced the draft
regulations was a woman, Yvette Cooper.
13 Select Committees are legislative bodies which de-
liberate upon complex issues and make recommen-
dations. Their reports, however, are not binding upon
government.
14 Cf. Parry (2003) on the lobbying strategies preced-
ing the debates: several science-based organisations’
statements “began by focussing upon the distinction
between reproductive and therapeutic cloning”.
15 This strategy is comparable with the invention of the
“pre-embryo” during the debates on the HFE Bill in
the 1980ies. As Spallone (1989, 50ff.) writes, the
“coining of the term pre-embryo was a political act”
to accommodate the 14-day time limit. The term was
introduced after the 14-day limit had been “agreed”
upon in order to justify this time span. It helped to
create an opposition between the pre-embryo and the
“proper” embryo and to legitimise research on pre-
embryos while ruling out the other.
16 Sarah Parry (2003) analyses the “return of the em-
bryo question” in 2000/2001 as compared to the pre-
1990 debates and concludes the convergence of em-
bryos and stem cells and that stem cell research has
been framed by the interests of the UK economy and
its biotechnology industry. My analysis draws on and
supports her findings, but my focus is on the politi-
cal effects of individualising and moralising the is-
sue, that is on the convergence of deregulations and
regulation.
17 Scientific lobby groups warned that scientists would
leave the country if the new research was not legal-
ised.
18 Just to be sure, I do not deny people’s suffering nor
the need for alleviation but want to criticise the
instrumentalisation of suffering in the debates.
19 The BSE crisis served as an example of the failure to
control science. This crisis was attributed to a lack
of scientific knowledge within the regulatory pro-
cess, a lack which was portrayed as creating danger,
rather than science itself.
20 This is similar to Franklin’s (1997, 177) description
of IVF as a “hope technology”.
21 Note that supporters and opponents converge in their
opposition to the deliberate destruction of embryos,
although in different ways: while opponents gener-
160
ally oppose embryo destruction, supporters justify it
as long as it is for useful ends.
22 The terms “degenerative” and “serious diseases” were
used interchangeably throughout the debates. But the
conditions referred to were not only degenerative
diseases such as Parkinson’s or Alzheimer’s, but also
illnessess such as strokes, burns or spinal cord inju-
ries.
23 The term “women”, however, occurred very rarely.
Speakers instead referred to the “uterus” or “womb”
or more generally to “patients” or “individuals”. Thus
to speak of “women’s participation” seems slightly
exaggerated.
24 A recent (2002) book by Mary Warnock (convenor
of the Warnock report that laid the groundwork for
the 1990 HFEA) suggests that this border is rather
inefficient. In an interview, she claimed that there
would be no ethical reason to prohibit human repro-
ductive cloning if it could be made safe. Fears, she
went on, were based on the assumption that repro-
ductive cloning would be completely uncontrolled.
In reality, however, it could be tightly controlled and
thus opposition would be irrational (The Independ-
ent 27 July 2002; http://www.independent.co.uk/
story.jsp?story=318837#top).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Department of Health (2000a). Stem Cell Research:
Medical Progress with Responsibility,
http://www.doh.gov.uk/cegc/stemcellreport.htm.
Department of Health (2000b). Government Response
to the Recommendations Made in the Chief Medical
Officers Expert Group Report “Stem Cell Research:
Medical Progress with Responsibility”, Norwich: The
Stationery Office (TSO) & http://www.doh.gov.uk.
Franklin, Sarah (1997). Embodied Progress. A Cultural
Account of Assisted Conception, London/New York.
Franklin, Sarah (1999a). Making Representations. The
Parliamentary Debates on the Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act, in:  Jeanette Edwards/Sarah
Franklin/Eric Hirsch/ Frances Price/Marilyn
Strathern (Eds.): Technologies of Procreation: Kin-
ship in the Age of Assisted Conception, London/New
York, 127-165.
Franklin, Sarah (1999b). Dead Embryos. Feminism in
Suspension, in: Lynn M. Morgan/Meredith W.
Michaels (Eds.): Fetal Subjects, Feminist Positions,
Pennsylvania, 61-82.
Gratton, Brigitte (2003). Survey on the National Regu-
lations in the European Union Regarding Research
on Human Embryos, http://europa.eu.int/comm/
european_group_ethics/docs/nat_reg.pdf.
The Guardian (2001). The Full Stem Cell Ruling. The
Full Ruling into Stem Cell Research by the High
Court, http://EducationGuardian.co.uk/Medical Sci-
ence/Stem cell ruling.
Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 17 Nov. 2000,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/
cmhansard.htm, zit. als HC 17/11/2000.
Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 15 Dec. 2000,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/
cmhansard.htm, zit. als HC 15/12/2000.
Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 19 Dec. 2000,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/
cmhansard.htm, zit. als HC 19/12/2000.
Hansard, House of Lords Debates, 22 Jan. 2001, http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldvol621.htm,
zit. als HL 22/01/2001.
HFEA/HGAC 1998: Human Fertilisation and Embry-
ology Authority & Human Genetics Advisory Com-
mission (1998). Cloning Issues in Reproduction, Sci-
ence and Medicine, http://www.doh.gov.uk/hgca/pa-
pers/papers_c.htm.
House of Commons (2002). House of Commons
Factsheets – Members/Elections Series No.4
“Women in the House of Commons”, http://
www.parliament.uk/directories/hcio.cfm, zit. als HC
Factsheets 2002.
Morgan, Derek/Robert G. Lee (1991). Human Fertilisa-
tion and Embryology Act 1990: Abortion and Em-
bryo Research, the New Law, London.
Mulkay, Michael (1993). Rhetoric of Hope and Fear in
the Great Embryo Debate, in: Social Studies of Sci-
ence, 23, 721-742.
Mulkay, Michael (1994). The Triumph of the Pre-Em-
bryo: Interpretations of the Human Embryo in Par-
liamentary Debate over Embryo Research, in: So-
cial Studies of Science, 24, 611-639.
Mulkay, Michael (1997). The Embryo Research Debate.
Science and the Politics of Reproduction, Cambridge.
Parry, Sarah (2003). The Politics of Cloning: Mapping
the Rhetorical Convergence of Embryos and Stem
Cells in Parliamentary Debates, forthcoming in: New
Genetics and Society 22(2).
Rose, Nikolas (1999). Powers of Freedom: Reframing
Political Thought, Cambridge.
Rose, Nikolas (2001). The Politics of Life Itself, in:
Theory, Culture and Society, 18(6), 1-30.
Schneider, Ingrid (2003). Neue Formen der
Sozialpflichtigkeit des weiblichen Körpers, in: Sigrid
Graumann/Ingrid Schneider (Eds.): Repro-Genetik
– feministische Reflexion der neuen Biopolitik,
Frankfurt/M, New York (forthcoming).
Schön, Donald/Martin Rein (1993). Reframing Policy
Discourse, in: Frank Fischer/John Forester (Eds.):
The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Plan-
ning. Durham/London, 145-166.
Select Committee 2002: House of Lords Select Commit-
tee on Stem Cell Research (2002). Stem Cell Research
– Report, http://www.publications.parliament,uk/pa/
ld200101/ldselect/ldstem/83/8301.htm.
Sexton, Sarah (1999). If Cloning is the Answer, What
was the Question? Power and Decision-Making in
the Geneticisation of Health. The CornerHouse Brief-
ing 16, 1999, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/
briefing/16clone.html.
Sexton, Sarah (2000). How to Talk About Cloning
Without Talking About Cloning. Public Discourse
in the UK. The CornerHouse Document, http://
www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/document/biomed.html,
161
(published in Biomedical Ethics, 5(3), December
2000).
Spallone, Pat (1989). Beyond Conception: The New
Politics of Reproduction, London.
Warnock, Mary (2002). Making Babies: Is There a Right
to Have Children? Oxford.
AUTHOR
Svea Luise HERRMANN, geb. 1966, promoviert am
Institut für Politische Wissenschaft der Universität
Hannover zum Thema „Policy-Diskurse im Politikfeld
der Reprogenetik in Großbritannien und Deutschland“
(AT). Seit April 2002 Promotionsstipendiatin bei der
Heinrich Böll-Stiftung, Berlin.
Forschungsschwerpunkte: Biopolitik, Biomedizin-
politik, Policy-Analyse, Diskursanalyse. Schriften:
„What is the Problem? Policy Discourses on Repro-
genetics in Germany since the mid-1990s. Paper pre-
sented at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, 22-27
March 2002, Turin, Italy; „Bioethics Education: Bioethik
und Normalisierung“, in: Kathrin Braun (1999) (Hg.):
Life is a battlefield. Aspekte der Biomacht, Hannover.
Adresse: Wittekindstr. 16, D-30449 Hannover;
Universität Hannover, IPW, Schneiderberg 50, D-30167
Hannover
E-Mail: s.herrmann@ipw.uni-hannover.de
